fix(presets): re-validate catalog URL after redirects (HTTPS parity/security)#3523
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jawwad-ali wants to merge 2 commits into
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fix(presets): re-validate catalog URL after redirects (HTTPS parity/security)#3523jawwad-ali wants to merge 2 commits into
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Pull request overview
Adds post-redirect URL validation for preset catalog fetching.
Changes:
- Validates the final catalog URL before reading its payload.
- Adds redirect regression coverage and updates response mocks.
Show a summary per file
| File | Description |
|---|---|
src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py |
Adds final URL validation. |
tests/test_presets.py |
Tests insecure redirects and updates mocks. |
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- Files reviewed: 2/2 changed files
- Comments generated: 2
- Review effort level: Medium
mnriem
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Jul 15, 2026
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PresetCatalog._fetch_single_catalog opened the catalog URL and trusted the payload without re-validating response.geturl() after redirects. _open_url follows redirects (stripping auth only on an HTTPS->HTTP downgrade), so an https:// catalog entry that 30x-redirects to http://attacker/... was still fetched and trusted. The catalog payload supplies each preset's download_url + sha256, so a redirected payload can drive install of an arbitrary archive that passes verify_archive_sha256. Add the post-redirect geturl() re-validation via _validate_catalog_url, mirroring integrations/catalog.py, workflows/catalog.py, and bundler adapters — and presets/_commands.py, which already does this on its --from download path. This is the lone preset catalog-fetch site missing the guard. Test: an HTTPS URL whose response.geturl() reports http:// is rejected (PresetValidationError). Completed four existing fetch-test mocks that predated this behavior to report geturl() like a real urllib response. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…talog path Two follow-ups to the catalog redirect hardening: 1. Validate every redirect hop, not just the terminal URL. A final-geturl-only check passes an https -> http -> attacker-controlled-https chain: the insecure intermediate hop lets a network attacker rewrite the next redirect. _open_url now forwards a redirect_validator to open_url (called before each hop), and _fetch_single_catalog passes _validate_catalog_url through it while retaining the final geturl() check — mirroring bundler/services/adapters.py. 2. The legacy public fetch_catalog() single-catalog path parsed response.read() with no redirect check at all. Give it the same redirect_validator + final geturl() validation. Tests: a stubbed intermediate http hop is rejected (redirect_validator), and the legacy fetch_catalog() rejects an HTTPS->http redirected payload (fail before: no raise). Existing fetch-test mocks updated to accept the redirect_validator kwarg and report geturl() like a real response. Full test_presets.py (365) green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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What
PresetCatalog._fetch_single_catalogfetched the catalog JSON and trusted it without re-validating the post-redirect URL:_open_urlfollows redirects (stripping auth only on an HTTPS→HTTP downgrade), so anhttps://catalogentry.urlthat 30x-redirects tohttp://attacker/catalog.jsonis still fetched and trusted. Because the catalog payload supplies each preset'sdownload_urlandsha256, an attacker-controlled redirected payload defeatsverify_archive_sha256and can drive installation of an arbitrary archive.Fix
Re-validate
response.geturl()after the redirect via the existing_validate_catalog_url, exactly mirroring the other catalog systems:integrations/catalog.py(final_url = resp.geturl(); if final_url != entry.url: self._validate_catalog_url(final_url))workflows/catalog.py,bundler/services/adapters.pypresets/_commands.pyitself, which already does redirect re-validation on its--fromdownload path.This was the one preset catalog-fetch site missing the guard — clearly an oversight, not a deliberate omission.
Test
test_fetch_single_catalog_revalidates_redirected_url: an HTTPS URL whoseresponse.geturl()reportshttp://is rejected withPresetValidationError(fails before: no revalidation). Four pre-existing fetch-test mocks were completed to reportgeturl()like a realurllibresponse.🤖 Written with the assistance of Claude Code (AI). Bug self-found; fix/tests verified locally (fail-before / pass-after).